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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THOMAS C. PAPPALARDO
AND HELENA C. PAPPALARDO

)
)
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Appellants,

)
)
Case No. 14685

V.

PHILIP C. PUGSLEY

)

Defendant

)

AND
HARRY D. PUGSLEY

)

Defendant and
Respondent

)
)

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
This is a legal malpractice action brought by plaintiffsappellants alleging that defendants were negligent in their
representation of plaintiffs1 interests in real property.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
This case was tried before a jury with the Honorable
Gordon R. Hall presiding.

At the conclusion of plaintiffs1

case defendants moved for a dismissal as to both defendants.
The court granted the motion as to defendant Philip Pugsley
but allowed the plaintiffs to reopen their case as to defenDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

i

dant Harry Pugsley.

Thereafter, plaintiffs called defendant

Harry Pugsley as an adverse witness and again rested.
Defendants renewed their motions and the trial court
granted a motion for directed verdict pursuant to Rule 50
U.R.C.P. on the grounds that the evidence was insufficient
as a matter of law to sustain a finding that the defendants
were negligent in violating the accepted legal standards of
practice in Salt Lake City and the State of Utah and was also
insufficient as a matter of law to warrant a finding that the
plaintiffs had been damaged as a result of any alleged negligence of defendants.
This appeal is taken solely from the verdict directed
towards defendant Harry Pugsley.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant-respondent seeks an affirmance of the lower
court decision.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Because this Court must carefully review all of the evidence presented at trial to determine the propriety of the
directed verdict, the following detailed synopsis of the
pleadings and trial testimony is offered:
This action was commenced on January 2, 1975 by plaintiffs alleging that defendants were negligent in their legal
representation of plaintiffs' interest in certain property
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

located in Salt Lake County. (R., pp. 15-19).

More specifi-

cally, plaintiffs claimed that defendants were negligent in
advising plaintiffs not to borrow money to pay off delinquent installments concerning the property, were negligent
in referring some of the defenses to an attorney representing the equity owners, and in failing to file answers to the
complaints.

Plaintiffs sought damages for the sum of $30,000

and approximately $1,400 per month for loss of rental income.
(R., pp. 17-18).
Defendants in their answer asserted that they had advised plaintiffs to pay the delinquent obligations but that
plaintiffs responded they had no funds to do so and requested
that the defenses be referred to a lawyer representing the
equitable owner co-defendant.

Defendants asserted that the

matters were referred to duly licensed lawyers who agreed to
defend and did in fact defend several proceedings instituted
against plaintiffs and that defendants themselves filed pleadings in two cases. As affirmative defenses, defendants alleged that plaintiffs were estopped from claiming damages
because of their own inability to pay the obligation in spite
of numerous opportunities, that plaintiffs were guilty of
contributory negligence which was the primary cause of any
alleged loss, and that plaintiffs could claim no defense to
the delinquent contract actions.

(R., pp. 24-26).

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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On June 7, 1976 a jury trial was held before the Honorable Gordon R. Hall.
witnesses:

Initially, plaintiffs called only two

Thomas C. Pappalardo (.hereinafter Pappalardo) and

Paul Sharrot (hereinafter Sharrot).

After being allowed to

reopen their case plaintiffs also called defendant Harry Pugsley,
On direct examination, Pappalardo testified that in 1970
he owned six properties in Salt Lake City amounting to a total investment of $30,000.

(Tr., pp. 59-60).

In January of

1970 while at the real estate office of his son-in-law Sharrot,
Pappalardo met a Mr. Janis who was interested in forming a
property management corporation named Pacific States Investment Corporation.

Shortly thereafter, Pappalardo conveyed

his equity to the company in exchange for an unsecured promissory note in the amount of $30,000.

Pappalardo also gave the

company a promissory note for $4,900.

Under the terms of the

agreement he was to receive $7 00 a month from Pacific States
Investments Incorporated (hereinafter Pacific).

(Tr., p. 61).

After receiving only one good check from Pacific, Pappalardo and Sharrot visited the law office of Harry Pugsley.
(Tr., pp. 61-62).

At this meeting Harry Pugsley told Pappalardo

that the note he had received from Pacific was unsecured and,
according to Pappalardo, told him, "I'll do the best I can to
secure a promissory note and get a deed of trust for you and
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

in your behalf so that we can protect your equities".

(Tr.,

p. 62). Shortly thereafter, Pappalardo borrowed $1,000 and
gave it to Harry Pugsley for his retainer fee. At that time
a suit was commenced against Pacific and various individuals
including Sharrot who was then president of Pacific.

(Tr.,

p. 63? Exhibit 1 ) . The lawsuit filed by Harry Pugsley on behalf of Pappalardo resulted in a stipulation dated December
30, 1971 in which Pacific agreed to make any delinquent pay-,
ments and to provide Pappalardo with monthly reports.

(Exhi-

bit 1) .
On further direct examination, Pappalardo stated that
several months before the stipulation was signed, Pappalardo
received his first summons from a disgruntled legal title
owner of one of the properties Pappalardo had purchased and
later sold to Pacific.

(Tr., p. 65). He stated that he made

six separate trips to Harry Pugsley each time with a summons
or a notice of default.

(Tr., p. 63-69).

Pappalardo testi-

fied that upon each occasion Harry Pugsley informed him that
he did not need to worry about the notices and summons, that
he would insure that Pappalardo had sufficient time to borrow
money if necessary, and that he was going to contact Bill
Cayias, Pacificfs attorney, and make the corporation pay its
obligations.

(Tr., pp. 65-71).

Pappalardo testified that he

could have borrowed money for the delinquencies and further
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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I

testified that he repeatedly told Harry Pugsley of this fact.
(Tr., pp. 66, 68, 69).

«

Pappalardo testified that in 1972 he appeared before
Judge Croft at which time he was represented by Phil Pugsley,
•

Harry Pugsley's son.
restored to him.

At that time two of his properties were

Pappalardo stated that he asked Phil Pugsley

what had happened to the remaining properties and was told
at that time that they were "lost".

(Tr., p. 71). Pappa-

lardo attempted to testify as to the rental value of the property but the trial court precluded such testimony since the
agreement with Pacific precluded him from receiving rent.
(Tr., pp. 72-75) .
On cross-examination, Pappalardo admitted that in his
original transaction with Pacific he did not require Janis to
sign the note individually because his son-in-law Sharrot was
to become president of the corporation and he was told that
this would be sufficient security to protect his interests.
(Tr., p. 79). Pappalardo stated that he did not know at the
time of this transaction that he was conveying all of his equity
interest to Pacific and further that he could not understand
why he was required to give Pacific a $4,900 note but that his
son-in-law Sharrot said that it was required and he therefore
acquiesced.

(Tr., pp. 80-81).

Pappalardo testified that he began receiving the delinDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

<

guent notices even before he contacted Harry Pugsley and
that he was afraid then that he was going to lose his interest
in these properties.

(Tr., p. 82). Pappalardo verified that

in October of 1971 a suit was filed against Pacific and that
two months later a stipulation was agreed upon by all of the
parties.

(Tr., p. 83). The December 31, 1971 stipulation,

introduced in evidence as Exhibit 1, provided for the following:
1.

The corporation would execute a note in the
amount of $30,000 in favor of plaintiffs to
be paid in monthly installments of $600 at
8 per cent interest.

2.

The corporation, in order to give Pappalardo
proper security, would convey to him a Deed
of Trust as to each property.

3.

The corporation was to cancel Pappalardo's
original note to it of $4,900.

4.

M

The parties recognize and agree that because

of the dispute arising between them, the contract payments on a number of the properties
are delinquent and that it will take at least
six months for Pacific States Investments,
Incorporated, and its principals to place the
contracts covering the said properties in good
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

standing and current, and the parties agree
that such corporation shall start making payments of the said contract at once, shall
provide monthly reports reflecting such payments, and shall have a total of six months
to place the properties and the contract
thereon in good standing as far as payments
are concerned.

If said corporations fail to

do so, plaintiffs may exercise their rights
under the deed of trust."

(Exhibit 1, Tr.,

pp. 83-86) .
On further cross-examination, Pappalardo stated that one
suit had been filed previous to the stipulation agreement and
that the other five were filed in a period of time from January
to April of 1972. (Tr., p. 87; note:

line 2 should read 1972).

Pappalardo could not recall whether Harry Pugsley had told him
that his only defense was to raise the money.

(Tr., p. 88).

Pappalardo stated that he was willing to borrow on the property
but that he had been told that his equity wasn't sufficient and
that his son-in-law said he would combine his property so that
a loan could be obtained.

(Tr., p. 89).

Pappalardo did not testify as to any specific amount he
could have borrowed or as to where the money would have been
obtained.

Pappalardo admitted that he did not know the exact
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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amount owing on the back payments, did not know if attorney's
fees were being asked, and did not know whether the property
owners were seeking the entire unpaid balance as their claims.
(Tr., p. 90).
When asked if he knew how much the suits were asking
for he replied, "Well, at the present time, Sir, I canft tell
you truthfully, I can't."

(Tr., p. 90). Pappalardo stated

that he assumed that once the back payments were made the contracts would have been reinstated regardless of the delinquency.
(Tr., p. 91).
Finally, Pappalardo admitted that he was in destitute
financial circumstances during this time and that Harry Pugsley helped him to receive welfare assistance from the state.
(Tr., p. 92).
On re-direct examination Pappalardo testified that he did
not know what became of the lawsuits filed against him after he
handed the summonses to Harry Pugsley.

He further stated that

he no longer had the property referred to in the lawsuits.
(Tr., p. 93).
Plaintiffs called Paul Sharrot as their second witness.
Sharrot testified that he was the son-in-law of Pappalardo and
that he accompanied Pappalardo to Harry Pugsley's office at
the time of the first meeting.

(Tr., pp. 95-96).

Sharrot

testified that Harry Pugsley told them that he would commence
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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suit against Mr. Janis and Pacific and that in fact a suit was
commenced.

(Tr., p. 97).

Sharrot testified that Harry Pugsley had informed them
that it was Cayias1 client's obligation to make the delinquent
payments and that he would contact him about it.

(Tr. , p. 100).

Sharrot stated that he suggested money be borrowed and held in
escrow to satisfy the various land owners but that Harry Pugsley advised them against it saying that there was no need to
borrow the money or pay interest.

(Tr., p. 101). Finally,

on direct examination Sharrot stated that Pugsley on three
occasions stated he would answer the complaints.
103).

(Tr., p.

No testimony was given as to how much money would have

been borrowed or as to the source of such funds.
On cross-examination Sharrot stated that Mr. Janis induced
him to form the Pacific States Investment Corporation and that
he became president shortly after its formation.
104-105).

(Tr., pp.

Sharrot admitted that at the time the original trans-

action took place it appeared that $4,900 was in default and
for this reason he concurred with Mr. Janis that Pappalardo
should execute a $4,900 note to Pacific.

(Tr., p. 105).

Sharrot recounted that at least one default notice had been
served upon Pacific before the December, 1971 stipulation had
been agreed upon.

(Tr., p. 108). He admitted that a number

of the properties were delinquent at the time of the stipulation.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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(Tr., p. 109). He could not recall how much money was being
asked for in the various foreclosure suits or whether attorn e y ^ fees were being sought,

(Tr., p. 109). He could not

remember whether the entire unpaid balances were being demanded.

(Tr., p. 110). He could not recall whether Harry

Pugsley had informed him that Cayias would defend some of the
suits in that Pacific was also a named defendant.
111).

At this point, the plaintiffs rested.

(Tr., p.

(Tr., p. 112).

Defense counsel moved to dismiss for failure to prove
a violation of a legal standard of duty and for failure to
show any proximate cause of injury.

(Tr., pp. 114-119).

The

court granted the motion as to defendant Phil Pugsley, finding no evidence sufficient to maintain a claim.
119).

(Tr., p.

With serious reservations and over the objection of

defense counsel, the trial court allowed plaintiffs to reopen
their case in order to allow defendant Harry Pugsley to be
examined.

(Tr., p. 124).

Upon direct examination by plaintiffs, defendant Harry
Pugsley stated that he had been an attorney-at-law since 1936
and that he was acquainted with the standard of practice within the state of Utah.

(Tr., pp. 125-126).

He stated that if

a client should come to him with a summons and complaint concerning property that he would immediately inquire whether
the alleged back payments were due and if so he would advise
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the client to pay the obligation.

(Tr., p. 126).

Harry Pugsley further testified that he would not file
an answer that was not based upon valid facts and that in
this case Pappalardo had no funds, was on relief, and had
never informed Pugsley that he could raise the funds to make
the payments.

For this reason he did not file an answer al-

leging that payments had been made.

(Tr., p. 128).

Pugsley testified that he ultimately did file answers in
two cases and referred the others to Mr. Cayias since Pacific
was obligated to make the payments to the legal owners of the
properties.

(Tr., p. 130). He further advised the Pappalardos

to inquire from Security Title Company as to the status of each
property since it was arranged that it would be the trustee
under the deed of trust and would know the amounts owing.
(Tr., p. 131).
No pleadings were ever filed as to the two properties
recovered since it could not be legitimately plead that no
money was then owing.

(Tr., p. 131). Pugsley testified that

he received a letter from Cayias verifying the defense of one
suit and an oral assurance that he would defend another.
(Tr., p. 132).
At the conclusion of Pugsleyfs testimony plaintiffs
again rested and defendant Harry Pugsley renewed his motion
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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for dismissal.

(Tr., pp. 133-137).

After extensive arguments

the trial court granted a motion for directed verdict as to
both Philip Pugsley and Harry Pugsley on the grounds that no
expert testimony was offered by plaintiffs to show the rea-.
sonable duty of the defendants and that plaintiffs had failed
to show that any alleged negligence of defendants was the
proximate cause of any alleged property loss.

(Tr., pp.

137-138) .
This judgment was reduced to writing and signed by the
trial court on June 10, 1976.

(R., pp. 51-52).

Plaintiff's

appeal is taken from this judgment.
ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DIRECTED JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANT HARRY PUGSLEY.
At the conclusion of plaintiff's reopened case the trial
court ordered a direction of the verdict in favor of defendant
Harry Pugsley.

The court stated:

The Court is of the opinion that the plaintiff has
failed to bear the burden of proof here as to a
reasonable duty of the defendant, Harry Pugsley,
and has offered no expert testimony to support what
the duty was; and further, that the plaintiff has
failed to bear the burden of proof as to proximate
cause in this matter and for those reasons the Court
grants the motion also for a directed verdict to
Mr. Harry Pugsley. (Tr., pp. 137-138).
The trial court was correct in its ruling in light of the standard to be applied in legal malpractice cases and in light of
Digitized
the Howard
W. Hunter Law
J. Reuben Clark Law
School, BYU.
the standard
to bybe
applied
inLibrary,
directing
a verdict.
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It is well established that the elements of a legal
malpractice action are the existence of an attorney-client
relationship, the existence of a duty on the part of a lawyer, a failure to perform this duty, and a showing that the
negligence of the lawyer was a proximate cause of damage to
the client.

Hansen v. Wightman, 538 P.2d 1238 (App. Wash.

1975); Weiner v. Moreno, 271 So.2d 217 (Ct. App. Fla. 1973).
It is also well settled that the client bears the burden of
pleading and proving each and every fact essential to establish these elements of his case.

Harding v. Bell, 508 P.2d

216 (Ore. 1973).
Even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable
to plaintiffs as is required in a motion for directed verdict,
Boskovich v. Utah Construction Co., 123 U. 387, 259 P.2d 885
(1953); Finlayson v. Brady, 121 U. 204, 240 P.2d 491 (1951),
there is no doubt that plaintiffs failed to prove the essential
elements of a legal malpractice case and therefore were precluded from jury consideration.
A.

The Trial Court Was Correct In Directing A
Verdict Based Upon The Ground That Plaintiff Had Failed To Show That Any Alleged
Damages Were Proximately Caused From The Action Or Inaction Of Harry Pugsley.
The element of proximate cause is, of course, a

necessity in any action based upon negligence.

In a legal

malpractice Digitized
case,
however, a further step must be taken:
by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

i.e.,

not only that the original suit was lost because of the attorneyfs negligence but also that a different result would
have occurred but for that negligence.

The Supreme Court of

Oregon in Harding v. Bell, 508 P.2d 216 (1973) quoted with
approval the following authority:
It is in connection with negligence in the conduct
of litigation that the question of causation has
presented its most difficult problem. Here the
rule has developed that when the client lost his
case he must show not only that the attorney was
negligent but also that the result would have
been different except for the negligence. In
other words, this involves a "suit within a suit"
and the client must show that he would have won
the first suit as one step in order to win the
second one.
If the original action was lost, the client
must show that the original claim was a sound one
and that he was entitled to recover on it. If the
defense was negligently not presented in the original action, the client must show that it was a
valid one. 508 P.2d 216 quoting Wade, "The Attorney's Liability for Negligence", Professional Negligence (Roady and Andersen Bd. 1960) at 231-32.
See also Annot., 45 A.L.R.2d 5, 19-22 (1956); Leavitt, "The
Attorney As Defendant", 13 Hast.L.J. 129 (1961) and Coggin,
"Attorney Negligence. . .A Suit Within A Suit", 60 W.Va.L.Rev.
225, 235-36 (1958).
In the instant case plaintiffs failed in three different
areas in proving that their alleged damage was a proximate
result of defendant's actions even assuming a legal breach
had occurred.

These areas are as follows:

(1) Plaintiffs

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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failed to show what events occurred as to each individual property which caused its alleged loss; (2) Plaintiffs failed to
produce sufficient evidence to establish that the real estate
contracts could have been reinstated or that an action for
foreclosure could have been won regardless of defendant's
alleged negligence; (3) Plaintiffs failed to show that they
sustained any damage even assuming the property was lost.
(1)

Plaintiffs Failed To Show The Disposition Of Each Piece Of Property.
The plaintiffs in their complaint alleged that

because of the actions of defendant they were "foreclosed of
their equities in the properties".

(R., p. 5). However, ex-

cept for this statement there is no evidence in the record as
to what actually happened to each of the four properties which
were "lost".

In factf on direct examination Mr. Pappalardo

admitted that after receiving the summonses or notices of default that he did not know what happened in the lawsuits or
what happened to the property.

All he knew was that he did not

have the property any longer.

(R., pp. 92-93).

There was no showing by plaintiffs that the properties were lost by default or even foreclosed through judicial action.

This is illustrated by the following colloquy

between plaintiff's attorney and the trial court:
MR. DUNCAN:

The part of the burden of proof

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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was that he brought the summons to him and Mr. Pugsley didn't answer him.
THE COURT:

Well, Mr. Duncan, no evidence of

that.
MR. DUNCAN:

There is evidence he lost all the

property.
THE COURT:

Yes, but no evidence that he didn't

do what he was asked to do and maybe he did answer
them we don't know that.

I don't know, the jury doesn't

know, it isn't in evidence.
MR. DUNCAN:

We don't know what he did.

He didn't, Mr. Pappalardo doesn't

know what the complaints were.

He turned them all over

to Mr. Pugsley.
THE COURT:

Well, [that] is a matter of record. . .

wherever they were filed and [would] be easy enough
to ascertain if you wanted to find out what happened
to these cases.

(Tr., p. 123).

Thus, if plaintiffs are to allege damages resulting from the negligent actions of defendant in representing them in foreclosure actions, it is imperative that the
plaintiff show the consequences of the original foreclosure
actions.

How can Pugsley be charged with fault when plaintiffs

fail to even show what events transpired concerning the property for which damages are claimed?

As far as the record now
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stands, it is just as likely that the properties are still
controlled by Pacific Investment Corporation or just as likely
that Pacific voluntarily gave the property back to the original owners.
For this reason alone, the failure to establish the fate of each individual property precludes any recovery based upon negligent representation.
(2)

Plaintiffs Failed To Show That The
Contracts Could Have Been Reinstated
Or That They Would Have Prevailed In
Any Foreclosure Action.
Even if it were assumed arguendo that defen-

dant was negligent and that plaintiffs actually suffered a
loss, plaintiffs still failed to meet their burden of showing
that such negligence was the proximate cause of such loss.
The evidence was uncontradicted that almost immediately after having retained defendant, notices of default
were served upon Pappalardo.

(Tr., pp. 64-65, 108). The sti-

pulation entered into between the parties acknowledges a delinquency of past accounts and states that it would take Pacific at least six months to bring the contracts current.
hibit 1 ) .

(Ex-

At the time of the stipulation in December of 1971

a suit had already been commenced on one of the properties.
(Tr., p. 109). Thus, the record shows a history of delinquent
payments long before defendant was charged with failing to anDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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swer the foreclosure complaints.
Throughout the trial and in plaintifff s brief
it is alleged that they could have borrowed sufficient money
to pay off the obligation had it not been for defendant's
advice that such payment was unnecessary.
This argument is without merit for two reasons:
(1) since plaintiffs did not know how much was due and owing
under the contracts it was impossible for them to represent
that they had sufficient funds available; (2) plaintiffs presented no competent evidence that funds were available for them
to borrow in order to meet the unknown obligation.
As to the first reason, Pappalardo did not know
what amount was owing at the time the suits were commenced,
whether attorney's fees were being sought, or whether the entire balances were declared due under the real estate contract
provisions.

(Tr., p. 90). Likewise Paul Sharrot did not know

the answer to these questions.

(Tr., p. 109). No testimony

was offered by any of the property owners concerning the balances owing or whether the entire unpaid balances were required
for reinstatement.
As to the second deficiency, Pappalardo testified that he was unable to borrow on the properties because
of insufficient equities and that it would have been necessary
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for his son-in-law to combine with him to obtain the money.
(Tr., p. 89). He also testified that at that time he was in
dire financial straits and was even on state welfare.

(Tr.,

p. 91). There was no competent evidence whatsoever as to
how much money plaintiffs could have borrowed or when such
money would have been available.
In Creative Inception, Inc. v. Andrews, 377
N.Y.Supp.2d 1 (App. Div. N.Y. 1975) the appellate division
of the Supreme Court of New York reversed a verdict against
an attorney in which the plaintiff alleged that the attorney's
negligence resulted in a forfeiture of the plaintiff's liquor
license.

In rejecting plaintiff's claim for damages the court

stated:
No records of any kind were introduced into evidence
to substantiate the figures testified to by Mr. Nixon,
plaintiff's president. The sole evidence on damages
on this record consists of unacceptable unsupported
testimony, without the production of a single book,
bill, financial statement or any other paper." Id.
at 3.
Likewise, there is no supportive testimony or documentation
that plaintiffs could have borrowed any amount of money from
any institution.

Plaintiff's mere assertion that the money

was available is insufficient.

See also Fischer v. xTohnson,

525 P.2d 45 (Utah 1974) (No evidence that plaintiff had available money in which to close real estate transaction).
The requirement that plaintiff must show his
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capacity to borrow money is analogous to the requirement that
a plaintiff must show the financial solvency of a defendant
whom a claim could have been asserted against but for the alleged negligence of the attorney.
In McDow V. Dixon, 226 S.E.2d 145 CCt. App.
Ga. 1976) an action was brought against an attorney for failing to file a claim within the statute of limitations.

A

judgment was rendered against the attorney and he appealed.
The Court of Appeals held that since the plaintiff had not shown the financial capacity of the defendant it
could not be assumed that the defendant would have been able
to pay to plaintiff the same amount as the judgment rendered
against the attorney.

The record in that case was void of any

business records or financial statements showing the solvency
of the defendant.

Accordingly, the judgment was reduced to

that amount which an insurance company representing defendant
had originally offered to pay to the plaintiff before the statute of limitations had run.
Similarly, plaintiffs in their case failed to
show the amount required to satisfy the delinquent obligation
(the only way to avoid a forfeiture) and further failed to show
that such amount would have been available to plaintiffs for
payment.

Absent a showing that this amount could have been

satisfied or absent a showing of some other valid defense,
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plaintiffs1 interest could not have been jeopardized regardless of any negligence defendant Harry Pugsley may have
committed.

It was immaterial whether Pugsley answered the

complaint, went to trial, appealed or did anything else if
ultimately plaintiffs would lose the property because of insufficient funds.
This principle of showing a likelihood of
success in the original action is supported by this court's
decision in Young v. Bridwell, 437 P.2d 686 (Utah 1968).

In

that case an attorney was sued for failure to advise the plaintiffs to take an appeal in a case in which an adverse judgment
had been returned against them.

The lower court in the mal-

practice action determined that the appeal would not have resulted in a reversal.

This court affirmed the trial court

and stated that before a cause of action existed "it would
have to be shown that there was at least a reasonable likelihood of reversing the judgment and that it would have benefited the plaintiff."

Id. at 689.

Courts in other jurisdictions have carefully
scrutinized the element of proximate cause in legal malpractice cases and in many instances this factor alone has determined the outcome of the case.

In Coon v. Ginsbergf 509 P.2d

1293 (Ct. App. Colo. 1973) the appellate court reversed a
verdict in favor of plaintiffs, holding that plaintiffs had
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failed to show proximate causation.

In Coon the defendant-

attorney had represented plaintiffs in an attempt to set
aside a judgment previously entered against them.

At the

same time the attorney filed a counterclaim in the original
action.

Before these motions were heard, however, the at-

torney entered into a stipulation for a new judgment which
replaced the former judgment.

The plaintiffs claimed that

this stipulation was unauthorized and the jury awarded plaintiffs $17,3 00 against the attorney.

The appellate court in

reversing held that there was no evidence showing that had
the motion been prosecuted the judgment against the plaintiffs
would have been set aside, that the trial on the merits would
have resulted in a successful conclusion of the counterclaim,
or that the amount of the judgment obtained would have been
more favorable than the stipulated judgment.
Likewise, in Weiner v. Moreno, 271 So.2d 217
(App. Fla. 1973) the court reversed and remanded for a new
trial an action of malpractice against an attorney who had
failed to file a claim within the statute of limitations.

In

that case a decedent was involved in an automobile accident
and taken to a hospital where alleged medical malpractice took
place.

The defendant-attorney failed to file a timely claim

against the doctor and a judgment was awarded in the amount of
$75,000 against the attorney.

The appellate court reversed,
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holding that the trial court erred in precluding evidence

i
that the death resulted not from medical malpractice but from
the automobile accident and that the attorney's failure to
prosecute the doctor would have been immaterial.
Finally, in Harding V. Bell, 508 P.2d 216 (Ore.

f

1973) the Supreme Court of Oregon affirmed the trial court's

1
order of dismissal of a malpractice case based upon failure
of plaintiffs to show proximate causation.

In that case the

plaintiffs claimed that the defendant attorney failed to plead

j

the defense of accord and satisfaction in a mortgage foreclosure action and consequently lost the property.

The Oregon

Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs had failed to show suf-

^

ficient evidence of accord and satisfaction and therefore its
exclusion from the defense in the original action was not a
(

proximate cause of any loss.
These cases and their accompanying authorities
amply support the trial court's conclusion that plaintiffs
failed to produce any evidence that they could have reinstated
the contracts or prevailed in a foreclosure action regardless
of any negligence defendant may have committed.
(3)

Plaintiffs Failed To Show They Sustained Any Damage Even Assuming The
Houses Were Lost.
Plaintiffs maintained throughout the trial that

the four properties
had been lost and that they therefore sufDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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fered damages in excess of $15,000.

However, the plaintiffs

failed to show that Pacific States Investment Incorporated
was incapable of making its normal payments as provided in
the $30,000 promissory note executed in the original stipulation.

Pursuant to that stipulation, the corporation was to

pay plaintiffs $600 a month at 8 per cent interest and was
to give a deed of trust only as security for the payment of
this debt.
It is elementary that plaintiffs could still
proceed against Pacific States Investment Corporation under
the promissory note regardless of the disposition of the properties.

Only if the corporation were incapable of making

such payments could it be said that plaintiffs have suffered
any detriment.

There was no evidence presented in plaintiffs1

case showing the financial status of this corporation or why
the promissory note could not be executed upon.
The failure to prove this element of the case
also precludes any finding of proximate causation resulting
from defendant's alleged misconduct.
Thus, the plaintiffs completely failed in all
respects to show that any damages incurred were factually or
proximately caused by the alleged negligence of Harry Pugsley.
B.

The Trial Court Was Correct In Directing A
Verdict Based Upon The Ground That PlainDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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tiffs Had Failed To Produce" Expert Testimony To Prove Harry Pugsley Had Breached
A Duty To Plaintiffs,
Plaintiffs in their brief attempt to characterize
this case as a simple matter of failing to answer a complaint.
Reading appellants1 brief it would appear that the following
facts took place:

(1) that Pappalardo received several sum-

monses and complaints; (2) that he promptly took them to
Harry Pugsley; (3) that. Pugsley assured him he would answer
the complaints and protect their interest; (4) that Pugsley
did not answer the complaints; (5) that damages resulted from
the failure of Pugsley to plead. (Appellant's brief, pp. 2,
5, 9, 10). Were this characterization correct then plaintiffs1
argument that expert testimony was not necessary may be entirely plausible since it is likely a jury would have sufficient
common knowledge to know that Harry Pugsley breached a duty.
However, a review of the actual record and the evidence presented clearly shows that the ideal situation as outlined by plaintiffs is not supported by the facts of this case.
In truth, the record of plaintiffs1 evidence shows the following:

(1) plaintiffs ignorantly entered into a transaction

whereby they gave up all their rights to their property to a
corporation with no security that the corporation would ever
make its obligations (Tr., p. 80); (2) that the corporation defaulted in its payments and the property owners began notifying
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plaintiffs of the failure of payments (Tr. pp. 61, 64); (3)
that plaintiffs consulted with defendant Harry Pugsley who
told them he would attempt to rescind the original agreement
and protect plaintiffs' interest in the property (Tr., p. 62);
(4) that a lawsuit was instituted by Pugsley and consequently
the corporation agreed to give to plaintiffs a security interest in the property, to make all delinquent payments to
the property owners within six months of the stipulation, and
to immediately pay all current amounts owing (Ex. 1 ) ; (5) that
upon receipt of the summonses and complaints Pugsley informed
plaintiffs that the corporation under the stipulation was liable for the obligations to the property owners and that he
would be in contact with its attorney to rectify the situation (Tr., pp. 68, 100); (6) that there was no defense to the
allegations made by the property owners because the money they
were seeking had not been paid (Tr., p. 108); (7) that several
of the lawsuits were defended by attorneys representing the
corporation and that Pugsley himself filed answers in two of
them.

(Tr., pp. 129-131).
Thus, this is not a simple case of failure to file

"responsive pleadings" as is alleged in plaintiffs' brief.
Rather, it involves questions as to whether an attorney is obligated to defend a case where there is no valid defense, whe-
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ther he may rely upon a stipulation that another party shall
pay all obligations within six months, and whether an attorney has breached a duty by referring a defense to an attorney
representing a joint obligor.

These are not questions which

may be answered from the common experience of a jury.
This Court has addressed itself to the question
of legal malpractice on only two occasions.

In Young v.

Bridwell, 20 U.2d 332, 437 P.2d 686 (1968) this Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court in favor of an attorney charged with legal malpractice.

As to the question of a

professional duty this Court stated:
Counsel is required to possess the ordinary legal
knowledge and skill common to members of his profession. . . 437 P.2d at 690.
In Nauman v. Harold; K. Beecher and Associates, 24
U.2d 172, 467 P.2d 610 (1970) this Court reversed a judgment
in favor of a plaintiff who was injured when the wall of an,
excavation collapsed.

This Court held there was insufficient

evidence to show that the architect breached any duty or that
the architect's conduct fell below the standard of care gener
ally observed by architects in the locality.

This Court then

quoted a Michigan decision with approval which stated:
[T]he responsibility of an architect does not
differ from that of a lawyer or physician. When
he possesses the requisite skill and knowledge,
and in the exercise thereof has used his best
judgment, he has done all the law requires.
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After referring to Utah medical malpractice cases, this
Court then stated:
The liability of architects is based upon professional negligence with respect to which only those
qualified in the field can testify as to the standard of competence and care possessed by professional men in the locality and whether there has
been a breach of that standard of care, 467 P.2d
at 615.
Thus, this Court has held that the same high standards of
proof are required to show a breach of duty in a legal malpractice action as is required in a medical malpractice suit
or in any other action where a professional breach of duty
is claimed.
The Baxter v. Snow, 2 P.2d 257 (Utah 1931) and
Walkenhorst v. Kesler, 67 P.2d 654 (Utah 1937) cases cited
by appellants are not inconsistent with this standard.

In

both these medical malpractice cases this Court held that mere
conjecture or suspicion respecting lack of skill or care is
not sufficient evidence to allow a malpractice case to be submitted to a jury.

As stated in Walkenhorst;

The negligence of a defendant in a malpractice case
must be shown affirmatively. It is not sufficient
that there is a possibility of negligence. 67 P.2d
at 667.
These cases also establish that mere failure to obtain a result does not raise a presumption of want of proper care, skill,
and diligence in malpractice actions.

67 P.2d at 667; Dorf
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v. Relies, 355 F.2d 488, ,493 C6tii Cir. 1966).

An attorney

is presumed to have discharged the duty of his representation until the opposite has been made to appear.

Mazer v.

Security Insurance Group, 368 F.Supp. 418 CD. Penn* 1973) .
Were this the case the plaintiffs characterize it
to be, i.e., that plaintiffs had retained defendant to answer
complaints, had valid defenses to each of them but defendant
neglected to plead, then it would have been incumbent upon
the trial court to rule as a matter of law that defendant
had breached his duty to plaintiff.
This distinction is vividly brought out in the case
cited by appellants, Central Cab Company v. Clarke, 270 A.2d
662 (Md. 1970).

In Clarke a company had retained an attorney

to defend it in a personal injury action but the attorney decided not to proceed further with the case because of unsatisfactory financial arrangements.

The attorney, however, failed

to notify the company that he declined representation and in
the interim a judgment was taken against it by the plaintiff's
attorney.

The court stated the following concerning the fac-

tual distinctions to be made in determining whether expert
testimony is necessary:
There may well be cases where expert testimony is
required in regard to whether the conduct of the
attorney violates the standard of reasonable care
or diligence in the particular situation. . . .
The situation in the instant case is analogous to
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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cases involving medical malpractice in which a
dentist pulled the wrong tooth, and our predecessors held in affirming a judgment for the
plaintiff that there was no necessity for expert
testimony to establish that a dentist should not
pull the wrong tooth, . . . The same rule applies
in cases in which physicians have done an obviously negligent act such as accidentally amputating
the wrong arm, or negligently leaving a sponge
in a patient's body. Id., at 667.
See also Herman" v» Rubin, 227 S.E.2d 802, 805 (Ct. App. Ga.
1976); Moser v. Western Harness Racing Association, 89 Cal.
App.2d 1, 200 P.2d 7 (1949) (held as a matter of law that a
legal duty had been breached in failing to apply elementary
principles of corporate law involving pre-incorporation subscription agreements); Baxter v. Snow, 2 P.2d 257, 266 (Utah).
Plaintiffs failed to show that Harry Pugsley did not
in fact answer the complaints or that the attorney he referred them to did not in fact answer the complaints.

It

cannot be said as a matter of law that Pugsley violated his
standard of duty to plaintiffs in either tendering the defense of these cases to a joint obligor (where a stipulation
had been entered into that the obligor was to have six months
to bring the delinquent accounts current) or in failing to
answer a complaint where his client had no valid defense.
In this instance it was incumbent upon plaintiffs
to produce an expert witness who could testify as to the local custom and standard regarding stipulations, tendering of
defenses, and
defending
cases
with
no Clark
valid
defenses.
For
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example, was Pugsley obligated to comply with his clients'
wishes to "delay" the foreclosure actions or would the filing
of a pleading for delay be in violation of Rule 11 of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which states:
The signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading;
that to the best of his knowledge, information
and belief there is good ground to support it, and
that it is not interposed for delay. (Emphasis
added).
Obviously, this case falls in the category where expert opinion is required.
An analysis of cases in other jurisdictions also mandates this result.

In Baker v. Seal,- 225 N.W.2d 106 (Iowa 1975),

a case cited by appellant, the court held that the plaintiff
failed to meet her burden of proof in failing to establish by
expert testimony that a lawyer was negligent in proceeding under
an amended dram shop statute rather than its predecessor even
though the plaintiff claimed that the lawyer merely breached
his duty in failing to file within the statute of limitations.
In Brown v. Gitlin, 313 N«E.2d 180 (App.Ill. 1974)
the Illinois court sustained a judgment entered in favor of an
attorney on the grounds that the plaintiff had failed to introduce sufficient expert testimony showing that the attorney
was negligent in failing to register the sale of stock between
equal shareholders of a closed corporation.
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The Court of Appeals of Georgia in Berman v; Rubin,
227 S.E.2d 802 (App.Ct.Ga. 1976) sustained a lower court's
granting of summary judgment in an action brought by a client
against his attorney for allegedly failing to properly draft
a settlement agreement.

The court in holding that expert

testimony was necessary to establish that the document had
been improperly drawn stated:
The reason for this requirement is simply that the
jury cannot rationally apply a general statement
of the standard of care unless it is aware of what
the competent lawyer would have done under similar
circumstances. Nor can the jury be permitted to
speculate about what the "professional custom11 is*
Competent evidence as to the "professional custom"
in a given situation is required in malpractice actions against other professionals. . . Consistency
demands a similar standard for attorneys. Id,, at
806.
The California Court of Appeals in Starr v. Mooslin,
92 Cal.Rptr. 583, 14 Cal.App.3d 991 (Ct.App.Cal. 1971), cited
by appellants in their brief, dealt with the alleged negligent
giving of escrow instructions by an attorney.

The court up-

held the judgment for the plaintiff xvho had produced expert
witnesses to the effect that the defendant attorney had not
exercised the degree of care ordinarily possessed by attorneys
in good standing in that area.

The court cited with approval

previous California cases to the effect that without expert
testimony a jury would have no way of knowing what was proper
and would have no standard by which to judge the lawyer's acDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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tions:
Without expert testimony the confusion would be
great indeed in some situations (such as in a matter involving trial tactics) because a jury would
have no way of knowing what was proper and what
was improper and would have no standard by which
to compare the lawyer's actions. 92 Cal.Rptr. at
588,
The 7th Circuit Court of Appeals in Dorf v. Relies,
355 F.2d 488 (7th Cir. 1966) applied Illinois law to a case
where a plaintiff sued his former attorney for alleged negligence in the handling of the prosecution of a case.

In order-

ing a directed verdict for defendant, the Circuit Court stated:
It is the duty of an attorney to bring to the conduct
of his client's business the ordinary legal knowledge and skill common to members of the legal profession, to act towards his client with the most
scrupulous good faith and fidelity, and exercise in
the course of his employment that reasonable care
and diligence which is usually exercised by lawyers.
In the instant case there was no testimony, expert or otherwise, by which a jury could determine
that the conduct of Relies (the defendant) was not
within the standard above set forth. It is not discernible how a jury, without evidence, could determine what constitutes ordinary legal knowledge and
skill common to members of the legal profession.
Without expert testimony, it was left to a jury of
laymen to determine the reasonable care and diligence
which lawyers usually exercise when confronted with
the same or similar situations. Id. at 492.
Numerous courts have referred to medical malpractice
cases for guidance in the legal malpractice field.

Guidance on

this issue can be found in Utah as a result of a fairly subDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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stantial body of decisions by this Court clearly indicating
that Utah adheres to the rule that proof of negligent diagnosis or treatment in a medical malpractice case requires
that expert testimony establish the ordinary care and skill
required of a doctor in the community in which he serves.
Marsh v. Pemberton, 10 U.2d 40, 347 P.2d 1108 (1959); Anderson v. Nixon, 104 Utah 226, 139 P.2d 216 (1943).
The plaintiffs1 claimed error in the rulings of
the trial court concerning Pugsley's expert testimony is without merit (Appellants1 brief, pp. 10-12).

The question as-

sumed a fact not in evidence—that Pappalardo could raise the
money.

This question was improper as phrased.

The court

gave plaintiffs1 attorney ample opportunity to properly
elicit information from defendant.

(Tr., pp. 128-130).

Plaintiffs1 claim of error as to Pugsley's testimony of referral to Cayias is equally unjustified.

(Appellants1

brief, p. 11). The trial court did not strike any testimony
concerning the referral of the lawsuits to Cayias.

(Tr., pp.

i

129-^132) . The only reason the alleged conflict of testimony
between Pugsley and Pappalardo was not "left to the jury" was
simply that the trial court directed the verdict.
Plaintiffs attempt to equate this case with one in
which an attorney blatantly fails to answer a complaint on beDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

half of his client is simply unjustified.

In this case the

i
record shows that defendant did in fact answer two of the
four complaints given to him and referred the remaining lawsuits to Mr. Cayias, the corporation's attorney.
12 9-130).

(Tr., pp.

|

The question of the propriety of this referral,

the obligation to file an answer when there is no valid defense, and the requirement which the stipulation placed upon
the parties are all questions which should have been explored
through expert testimony establishing what other attorneys in
the community would have done.
The failure of plaintiff to produce such expert testimony required the trial court to rule, as a matter of law, that
no breach of duty had been shown.
CONCLUSION
Respondent Harry Pugsley would submit that the trial court
correctly directed the verdict in light of the record before
it at the

conclusion of plaintiffs1 case.

Plaintiffs failed to show what actually happened to the
property, failed to show that the contracts could have been
reinstated or that plaintiffs would prevail in a foreclosure
action, and failed to show that they could not still recover
on the promissory rote. Plaintiffs further failed to prove
that defendant-respondent Harry Pugsley had breached his professional duty
to plaintiffs.
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If the record now before this Court is sufficient to
submit plaintiffs1 claim of malpractice to the jury, "the
legal profession would be more hazardous than the law contemplates."

Dorf v. Relies, 355 F.2d 488, 494 (6th Cir. 1966)

This is clearly not the case and, therefore, the judgment of
the trial court must be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
tfADSWORTH, & RUSSON

Rex Hanson
702 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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